in district
court
fourth judicial
district
state
of minnesota
county
of hennepin
-----------------------------------------------------------
William J. Hageman, Charles
W. Hurd,
Kyle Knutson, Jim Lovestar,
Yves Nadeau,
Pradeep Ramanathan, Barbara
Starr, and
Randy Starr, sponsored
by the National
Coalition of Free Men, Twin Cities
Chapter;
Jean M. Cody, Merrit R.
Cody, Knute
Gladen,
Timothy Kinley, Charles R.
Perrin,
Theresa
Ditter, and Dan Barrett,
sponsored by R-KIDS
of
Minnesota; and Richard Doyle,
sponsored
by
the Men’s Defense Association, in behalf
of themselves and all others
similarly situated,
COMPLAINT
vs.
Rich Stanek, Commissioner of
Public Safety
for
the State of Minnesota,
Defendant
------------------------------------------------------------
Come now the plaintiffs, and, as and for their cause of action and claim
for relief, they set forth the following particulars, to wit:
A. JURISDICTION AND STANDING
1. This suit was originally brought as Scott Booth et al. v. Sheryl
Ramstad Hvass et al.,
No. 00CV1672MJD/JGL on the docket of the United States District Court for
Minnesota, the same commenced on July 17, 2000, upon service of process. Among those suing as plaintiffs in that
action before the said court upon an amended complaint, and joining as
plaintiffs in this suit, are the said William J. Hageman, Charles W. Hurd, Kyle
Knutson, Jim Lovestar, Yves Nadeau, Pradeep Ramanathan, Knute Gladen, Charles R.
Perrin, and Richard Doyle. The remaining individuals joining as plaintiffs in
this suit, viz., Barbara Starr, Randy Starr, Jean M. Cody, Merrit R. Cody,
Timothy Kinley, Theresa Ditter, and Dan Barrett, were not parties to the said
action before the United States District Court for Minnesota.
2. The objectives of the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota were, and the objectives of this suit are, upon rights to sue created by 42 United States Code, Sections 1983 and 1988(b), to secure a judgment declaring that the Minnesota Battered Women’s Act, hereinafter described in greater detail, is null and void under the equal protection clause of Amendment XIV, buttressed by Amendment XIX of the United States Constitution, and that, because null and void, the said Act authorizes no public spending of any kind or any administrative act whatever, and to secure an injunction enjoining all public spending appropriated by the Minnesota Legislature, or from any other source, for distribution under the said Act, together with reimbursement for costs and disbursements, and an award for attorneys’ fees. The said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota did not, and this suit does not specifically challenge or call into question any particular appropriation by the Congress of the United States to address the problem of domestic violence, so that judgment favorable to the plaintiffs in the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota would have left, and a judgment favorable to the plaintiffs in this suit will leave the State of Minnesota future discretion, by constitutionally valid and otherwise proper legislation, to qualify for any such appropriation of Congress under generally accepted principles of cooperative federalism.
3. This suit embraces a subject matter properly falling within the powers of the Minnesota District Court, which is a court of general jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution of 1974, and Section 484.01 of Minnesota Statutes, and as such, unless the United States District Court for Minnesota can and does take jurisdiction, the Minnesota District Court is competent to redress rights as provided in 42 United States Code, Sections 1983 and 1988(b).
4. All plaintiffs bringing the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota, and all new plaintiffs joining in this suit now are and over the past several years have been resident citizens of the State of Minnesota, all of them regularly paying taxes now and over the past several years to the State of Minnesota either upon income, or sales, or real estate, or personal property, or privileges, or franchises, or transactions, or other objects defined by law. Upon decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court, including McKee v. Likens, 261 N. W. 2d 566 (1977), all plaintiffs now coming forward in this suit premise their standing to sue in the Minnesota District Court as resident citizens and taxpayers of the State of Minnesota, seeking relief against unlawful public spending by the Minnesota Legislature, and to seek the remedies hereinabove defined.
5. The Minnesota Battered Women’s Act, as currently codified, is a single Act including Sections 611A.31 through 611A.375 of Minnesota Statutes, and derives from session laws enacted by the Minnesota Legislature, including Chapter 428 of Minnesota Laws of 1977, Chapter 732 of Minnesota Laws of 1978, Chapter 311 of Minnesota Laws of 1981, Chapter 4 of the Minnesota First Special Session Laws of 1981, Chapter 262 of Minnesota Laws of 1983, Chapter 545 of Minnesota Laws of 1983, Chapter 732 of Minnesota Laws of 1983, Chapter 655 of Minnesota Laws of 1984, Chapter 9 of Minnesota First Special Session Laws of 1985, Chapter 444 of Minnesota Laws of 1986, Chapter 629 of Minnesota Laws of 1988, Chapter 689 of Minnesota Laws of 1988, Chapter 272 of Minnesota Laws of 1991, Chapter 571 of Minnesota Laws of 1992, Chapter 226 of Minnesota Laws of 1995, and Chapter 445 of Minnesota Laws of 2000, all of which had been adopted and codified as aforesaid antecedent to the pendency of the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota.
6. The Minnesota Battered Women’s Act is not essentially a regulatory statute, but mainly operates to authorize and channel the spending of public money appropriated by the Minnesota Legislature, and thereby to address the problem of domestic violence against women in the State of Minnesota. The said Act is also a conduit for supplemental appropriations by Congress which are not here challenged or questioned; but, when such supplemental appropriations are spent as provided in the said Act, they are channeled to address domestic violence against women in the State of Minnesota. In the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota, it was stipulated and the plaintiffs here alleged that, under the said Act, during the fiscal year 1999, funds appropriated by the Minnesota Legislature for “battered women’s shelters,” and spent as per diem grants, amounted to $17,163,276, and, during the fiscal year 2000, such funds thus appropriated and spent amounted to $21,019,471; that, under the said Act, during the fiscal year 1999, funds appropriated by the Minnesota Legislature for other services, designated “battered women grants” in express language, amounted to $6,068,000, and, during the fiscal year 2000, such funds thus appropriated, designated, and spent amounted to $6,647,000; and that, during the fiscal year 1999, funds appropriated by Congress in grants channeled through the said Act, designated as “VOCA battered women” grants, amounted to $1,715,000, and, during the fiscal year 2000, such funds so appropriated, designated, and spent amounted to $2,473,000. All plaintiffs coming forward in this suit allege that comparable amounts of public money in the foregoing categories have been appropriated and spent under the said Act during the fiscal years 2001 and 2002, and will, unless restrained, continue to be appropriated and spent in the fiscal year 2003, and in subsequent fiscal years, all to support battered women’s centers or in the form of grants designated for and exclusively benefiting “battered women.”
7. Exclusive administrative responsibility for implementation of the said Act, including all spending authorized by the Minnesota Legislature, has been transferred by Reorganization Order No. 182 authorized by Section 16B.37 of Minnesota Statutes, and filed with the Secretary of State for the State of Minnesota on December 10, 1999, to the defendant Rich Stanek, successor in office and interest to Charlie Weaver who was the defendant in his place during the pendency of the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota, as such serving as Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Minnesota.
8. In the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota, following the close of pleadings, the plaintiffs, and the defendants including the said Charlie Weaver as Commissioner of Public Safety, filed full and elaborate motions, each side seeking summary judgment. The defendants, including the said Charlie Weaver, claimed that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue in federal courts as resident citizens and taxpayers of the State of Minnesota to challenge public spending by the Minnesota Legislature, relying principally upon Tarsney v. O’Keefe, 225 F. 3d 929 (8 Cir. 2000), and that the Minnesota Battered Women’s Act does not discriminate against men on account of sex, and so is not per se unconstitutional. The plaintiffs, including the said William J. Hageman, Charles W. Hurd, Kyle Knutson, Jim Lovestar, Yves Nadeau, Pradeep Ramanathan, Knute Gladen, Charles R. Perrin, and Richard Doyle, maintained that they had standing to sue in federal courts for the relief sought as resident citizens and taxpayers of the State of Minnesota, relying principally on Crampton v. Zabriski, 101 U. S. 601 at 609 (1883), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 at 105-106 (1968), together with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), and various other decisions of the United States Supreme Court on equal protection as a prohibition of race or sex discrimination and also as a limitation on public spending; and the said plaintiffs further maintained that the said Act is per se unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection, because it is inherently discriminatory against men on account of sex, etc. On August 13, 2001, the United States District Court for Minnesota entered judgment dismissing the amended complaint, and concluding, “Since the plaintiffs failed to meet both constitutional and prudential requirements for standing, this court is without jurisdiction over this complaint.” [Emphasis added]. On September 11, 2002, as reported in Booth v. Hvass, 302 F. 3d 849, the said judgment dismissing the amended complaint was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. On January 13, 2003, a writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. There was thus no decision on the merits. Nor, under the circumstances, was it procedurally possible to reach the merits upon the said final judgment, and, therefore, the merits may still be litigated between the parties to this suit before any court of competent jurisdiction, free of the preclusive effects of estoppel by judgment or collateral estoppel as branches of res judicata.
9. By reason of the final judgment entered in the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota, the plaintiffs bringing this suit, who also sued previously in the said action before the said court, plead against the defendant Rich Stanek as Commissioner of Public Safety the principle of estoppel by judgment as a branch of res judicata, and as defined in Howe v. Nelson, 135 N. W. 2d 687 (Minn. 1965), so as to preclude his right to claim that the said court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit, and thus his right to seek removal of this cause to the said court under 28 United States Code, Section 1441(a).
10. By reason of the final judgment in the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota, the new plaintiffs bringing this suit, who did not sue previously in the said action before the said court, plead against the defendant Rich Stanek as Commissioner of Public Safety the principle of collateral estoppel as a branch of res judicata, and as defined in Lustik v. Rankila, 131 N. W. 2d 741 (Minn. 1964), so as to preclude his right to claim that the said court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit, and thus his right to seek removal of this cause to the said court under 28 United States Code, Section 1441(a).
11. By reason of the position taken and successfully maintained by the said Charlie Weaver with respect to standing in the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota, all of the plaintiffs plead against the defendant Rich Stanek in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Safety the principle of judicial estoppel as defined in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742 (2001), so as to preclude his right to claim that the United States District Court for Minnesota has jurisdiction to entertain this suit, and thus his right to seek removal of this cause to the said court under 28 United States Code, Section 1441(a).
12. The plaintiffs in this suit have no adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, invoke the equitable powers of the Minnesota District Court.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
13. The Minnesota Battered Women’s Act originated in a bill introduced as Senate File No. 124 in the 70th Legislature of the State of Minnesota, entitled “A bill for an act relating to women, establishing programs to provide emergency shelter and support services to battered women, providing funds to establish community education programs about battered women, providing for data collection, waiving certain general assistance eligibility requirements for battered women, appropriating money,” etc. This bill was amended in certain minor respects not here material, and, as such, was passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives, then was approved by the Governor on May 23, 1977, as Chapter 428 of Minnesota Laws of 1977, containing the basic structure of the Minnesota Battered Women’s Act as it stands today, and never since materially changed.
14. With respect to the said Senate File No. 124, the Journal of the Senate for the 53rd day of the session, May 12, 1977, pp. 2176-2178, records that a motion was made to strike “women” and to insert “persons,” etc., so as to make the legislation nondiscriminatory against men, but the amendment was defeated by a vote of 15 yeas and 37 nays.
15. With respect to the said Senate File No. 124, the Journal of the House of Representatives for the 59th day of the session, May 20, 1977, pp. 3216-3218, records that a motion was made to strike “women” and to insert “persons,” etc., so as to make the legislation nondiscriminatory against men, but the amendment was defeated by a vote of 51 yeas and 72 nays.
16. During the said proceedings concerning Senate File No. 124 before the House of Representatives, a particularly acute debate took place in which the main supporter of the bill directed swelling oratory against men as the culprits in all domestic violence in American society, then ridiculed the suggestion by opposition speakers that women also initiate and carry out acts of domestic violence. The said main supporter explained clearly that the bill was intended to benefit women only, and to discriminate against men. A transcript of the said proceedings, including all remarks made during the debate as preserved in the official records of the House of Representatives on May 20, 1977, is attached to this complaint as exhibit 1.
17. The Minnesota Battered Women’s Act, therefore, rests on the statutory premise that men are the cause of all or virtually all domestic violence, and was intended to protect women and only women from domestic violence. And it was intended that funds under the said Act be spent for the benefit of women but not men. By virtue of its express language and legislative history, the said Act cannot be read to avoid discrimination against men on account of sex. Among other things,
(a) The Revisor of Statutes for the State of Minnesota has over many years up to the present time designated the interconnecting provisions of the said Act, appearing from and after Section 611A.31 of the official version of Minnesota Statutes, in large dark letters “BATTERED WOMEN,” which obviously means that the said Act is for battered women, not battered men, and not battered persons;
(b) In the several provisions following, the primary subject is indicated by the phrase “battered women,” and, in order to prevent reading the feminine as inclusive of the masculine, Section 611A.31, Subd. 2, of Minnesota Statutes defines “battered woman” as “a woman who is being or has been victimized by domestic abuse within the meaning of Section 518B.01, Subd. 2,” including most particularly certain acts in the nature of physical assault committed within a family or household;
(c) All public grants made under the said Act, including all those mentioned in disclosures in response to stipulated discovery by counsel for the State of Minnesota during the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota, have been designated for “battered women.” And all such disclosures constitute an admission attributable to the defendant Rich Stanek as Commissioner of Public Safety under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence;
(d) In part 10 of the answer to the amended complaint filed in the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota in behalf of the said Charlie Weaver, it was specifically pleaded that shelters funded under the said Act provide assistance to “battered women and their children.” This averment constitutes an admission, as such attributable to the defendant Rich Stanek as Commissioner of Public Safety under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence;
(e) In part 9 of an affidavit sworn by Susan Neis filed in the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota in behalf of the said Charlie Weaver, it was said that a certain institution funded under the Minnesota Battered Women’s Act deals with problems of battered men and battered women, but that the funding to provide assistance to battered men comes from a source other than the State of Minnesota. This statement constitutes an admission, as such attributable to the defendant Rich Stanek as Commissioner of Public Safety under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence;
(f) In part 8 of an affidavit sworn by Mary Bibus and part 12 of an affidavit sworn by Robert Erickson, the same filed in the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota in behalf of the said Charlie Weaver, it was said that the State of Minnesota has no records or data to substantiate any spending for battered men. This statement constitutes an admission, as such attributable to the defendant Rich Stanek as Commissioner of Public Safety under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence;
(g) While Sections 10-21 of Article 2 in Chapter 445 of Minnesota Laws of 2000 add the term “domestic abuse” victims or programs to Sections 611A.31 through 611A.36 of Minnesota Statutes, the term “battered women” continues to permeate the said Sections 611A.31 through 611A.36 and to describe the sole recipients of emergency shelter services. Moreover, the term “domestic abuse” victims or programs, when read together with associated language and context in keeping with the principle noscitur a sociis, plainly means or concerns battered women and their children who have been harmed by certain acts in the nature of physical assault or certain sex crimes within a family or household. In any event, the provisions in the said Act containing the term “domestic abuse” victims or programs are not severable from the provisions giving reference to “battered women” in the sense defined by Section 645.20 of Minnesota Statutes;
(h) In Section 23 of Article 2 in Chapter 445 of Minnesota Laws of 2000, Section 611A.371 of Minnesota Statutes was added to what now is properly called the Minnesota Battered Women’s Act. The second subdivision of the said Section 611A.371 introduces a nondiscrimination clause for all shelters providing housing and services funded under the said Act. The said clause prohibits discrimination against any “battered woman” on account of “race, color, creed, religion, national origin, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, disability, or sexual orientation.” While thus broadly prohibiting discrimination against women on almost any basis imaginable, the said clause plainly does not prohibit any discrimination whatever against men on account of sex. The said clause is a negative pregnant which by implication affirms a statutory right to discriminate, and a legislative intent to authorize discrimination against men on account of sex;
(i) The legal meaning of the Minnesota Battered Women’s Act is also clear from a bill introduced during the 82nd Legislature of the State of Minnesota, viz., House File No. 699 (2nd engrossment, posted March 26, 2001). Section 25, Subd. 2, thereof proposes an appropriation of $7,500,000 for shelters and safe homes under the said Act, then adds a proposal for an appropriation of $100,000 for “men who are domestic abuse victims and their children.” No further progress was made on this bill, which nevertheless shows that all assistance and funding under the said Act has always been understood and intended by the Minnesota Legislature to be for women and their children, but excluding men, unless the said Act should be fundamentally modified to provide otherwise, as has never occurred; and
(j) There is no comparable statute or regulation promulgated under the authority of the State of Minnesota which authorizes public spending or services in behalf of men, or individuals without regard to sex, who have been targeted by domestic violence.
18. Even at the time of the said proceedings to adopt the said Senate File No. 124 during the 70th Legislature of the State of Minnesota on the basis of sexist stereotypes against men in general, it was already known and already documented in published empirical studies that women initiate and carry out physical assaults on their male companions in a high percentage of cases. And it has since been overwhelmingly established in published empirical studies that, generally speaking, women initiate and carry out physical assaults against their partners about as often as men do, that in some situations women may be more prone to domestic violence than are men, and that female instigation and participation in domestic violence is, in any event, a major social problem. A significant part of this work was pioneered and carried out by university women, including Dr. Suzanne Steinmetz, Dr. Jacquelyn White, and Dr. Michelle Corrado. In support of these propositions, the plaintiffs offer for judicial notice a bibliography compiled by Dr. Martin S. Fiebert of the Department of Psychology at California State University, Long Beach, of one hundred thirty-six scholarly investigations in English by qualified social scientists in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, including one hundred seven empirical studies and twenty-seven articles reviewing and analyzing massive empirical data which rests upon an aggregate sample size in excess of 94,000, the same published over the past twenty-six years. Whatever might earlier have been claimed, the State of Minnesota and its public officers and agents, including the defendant Rich Stanek as Commissioner of Public Safety, cannot now plead ignorance of this large corpus of scholarly and peer-reviewed literature, especially insofar as the articles making up the bulk thereof, carefully reproduced, were delivered in two thick files to counsel for the State of Minnesota in the presence of a United States Magistrate during the pendency of the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota. The said bibliography is attached hereto and made a part hereof for fair use as exhibit 2, with the consent of Dr. Fiebert who nevertheless does not surrender his copyright. A well-known illustration from such bibliography consists of an elaborate and comprehensive view of professional literature published by qualified scholars, both men and women, in peer-reviewed journals, the same fairly representative and listed on page 16 of the said exhibit 2, viz., an article by Dr. Murray Straus of the Family Research Laboratory at the University of New Hampshire, being chapter 4, pp. 67-88, entitled “Physical Assaults by Wives, A Major Social Problem,” in a compilation edited by Dr. Richard Gelles and by Dr. Donileen Loseke, the same entitled Current Controversies on Family Violence, SAGE Publications, Newbury Park, California, 1993. Dr. Straus stated his basic conclusion, which the plaintiffs in this suit themselves allege, in these words:
“To avoid the problem of male underreporting, the assault rates were computed for this chapter on the basis of information provided by 2,994 women in the 1985 National Family Violence Survey. The resulting overall rate for assault by wives is 124 per 1,000 couples, compared with 122 per 1,000 by husband as reported by wives. The difference is not great enough to be statistically significant. Separate rates were also computed for minor or severe assaults. The rate of minor assaults by wives was 78 per 1,000 couples, and the rate of minor assaults by husbands was 72 per 1,000. The severe rate was 46 per 1,000 couples by wives, and 50 per 1,000 for assaults by husbands. Neither difference is statistically significant.” -- Ibid., pp 68-69.
19. The evidence covered by the said investigations is proper for judicial notice, because it relates, not to adjudicative facts, but to so-called “legislative” facts which are relevant to the understanding, discovery, or formulation of a legal rule or conclusion, as has been and still is allowed by the United States Supreme Court in determining whether sex-specific regulatory statutes or legislated sex discrimination is or is not a violation of equal protection or related constitutional principles. See, e. g., the argument of Louis Brandeis for the State of Oregon, sustained in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908), and the analysis of Justice William Brennan in Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 at 199-204 and 209 fn. 22 (1976).
20. In any event, it is undeniable and subject to judicial notice that domestic violence, like alcoholism, is a social problem significantly shared by men and women alike, both as individuals committing physical assault and as individuals targeted by physical assault. And this fact is virtually conceded in part 10 of an affidavit sworn by Marie Bibus filed in behalf of the said Charlie Weaver in the said action before the United States District Court for Minnesota, wherein was cited a report of the United States Department of Justice published in November 1998 as the view of the State of Minnesota, which estimates in a table thereof labeled exhibit 7 that, in the calendar year 1995, in a certain large defined category of domestic violence in the United States, about 835,000 physical assaults, or about 39% of the whole number estimated, were perpetrated by women against men. This statement constitutes an admission, as such attributable to the defendant Rich Stanek as Commissioner of Public Safety under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence.
21. The Minnesota Battered Women’s Act is unconstitutional in its entirely and on its face, or, if certain incidental provisions thereof are not per se unconstitutional, such incidental provisions are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon the main provisions which are per se unconstitutional that the Minnesota Legislature cannot be presumed to have intended to enact such incidental provisions without also enacting such main provisions, and, furthermore such incidental provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and cannot be executed in accordance with the intent of the Minnesota Legislature, so that, in any event, the whole of the said Act is null and void as if never enacted. The said Act is thus null and void under the equal protection clause of Amendment XIV, reinforced by Amendment XIX of the United States Constitution, because the said Act works sweeping discrimination against men on account of sex, and because it is therefore by strong presumption unconstitutional, and yet such discrimination ordained by the said Act cannot be given an extremely persuasive justification which, cumulatively speaking, is substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives, is genuine, is well founded in fact, is not invented post hoc in reaction to litigation, does not rely on overbroad generalities concerning the differences between men and women, and does not rest on fixed notions concerning the characteristics of men and women. And on this account, the public spending under the said Act is unlawful, and subject to redress under 42 United States Code, Section 1983.
22. At the time the Minnesota Battered Women’s Act was originally enacted during the 70th Legislature, and ever since, it has been clear from numerous, emphatic, and published decisions of the United States Supreme Court that the said Act is unconstitutional, as public officers of the State of Minnesota have known or should have known from the beginning. Among those decisions are Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 262 U. S. 525 (1923), Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 645 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7 (1975); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 357 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Wescott, 443 U. S. 76 (1979); Wengler v. Druggists, 446 U. S. 142 (1980); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455 (1981); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718 (1982); J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127 (1994); and United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515 (1996).
23. Because of the passion and prejudice underlying and caused by the Minnesota Battered Women’s Act, it is practically impossible to secure a political remedy as by repeal or modification of the said Act by the Minnesota Legislature, and the only feasible remedy for these plaintiffs and all others similarly situated is impartial judicial consideration according to objective principles of law. And for this reason also the intervention of the Minnesota District Court is urgently sought in this suit.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs pray this honorable Court for certification of an appropriate class as may be needed in due course to advance objectives of this cause; for a judgment declaring that the Minnesota Battered Women’s Act is null and void as if never passed, and inoperative to authorize any public spending or administrative acts because contrary to and prohibited by the equal protection clause of Amendment XIV, reinforced by Amendment XIX of the United States Constitution; and for an injunction against the defendant Rich Stanek as Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Minnesota, enjoining him or his successors in office from allowing the expenditure of any further funds from any source whatever under and through the said Act, or to promote any object certified and approved under the said Act; together with costs, disbursements, and attorneys’ fees as allowed by 42 United States Code, Section 1988(b) in suits brought under 42 United States Code, Section 1983; and for such further or alternative remedy as may be necessary and proper, and in the interests of justice.
Dated:____________________________
________________________________________________
JOHN REMINGTON GRAHAM (#3664X)
180 Haut de la Paroisse
St-Agapit
(LOTB)
Quebec G0S 1Z0 Canada
Telephone 418-888-5049;
Of
counsel:
_________________________________________
Joseph R.
Sahid, Esq.
of the New
York Bar
845 Third
Avenue, 20th Floor
New York, New York 10022
Telephone: 212-308-5930
________________________________________________
MARK
A. OLSON (#82119)
2605 East Cliff Road
Burnsville, Minnesota 55337
Telephone: 952-894-8893; and
_________________________________________________
THOMAS B. JAMES (#179747)
440 North Broadway Avenue
Cokato, Minnesota 55321
Telephone: 320-286-6425
Counsel for the plaintiffs
